PURPOSE
The U.S. use of economic sanctions as the instrument of choice from among the four options, (political, economic, military and informational), has always been an alluring one.
Judging by the number of times in U.S. history some form of economic sanctions have been imposed on other sovereign nations, policy makers apparently believe that the use of this economic instrument will produce the desired result, or at least, aid in achieving the desired result. Whether this belief stems from the appearance that this option is the least costly in terms of blood and treasure, or because these policy makers genuinely believe the use of economic sanctions alone will achieve the desired results is unclear. What is clear from the vast quantities of literature available on the subject, is that the imposition of economic sanctions against another sovereign nation rarely produces the desired results. There are instances in history where they have worked satisfactorily, but they are generally the exception rather than the rule.
Using the imposition of U.S. unilateral economic sanctions against Iran and Cuba as case studies, and discussing other instances of sanctions, this paper will examine why these sanctions are not working, why they will not produce the desired change in Iran's and Cuba's behavior, and look at how economic sanctions are rapidly becoming obsolete as a subset of the available tools within the economic instrument of national power. Taking this concept one step further, this paper will look at how the concept of sanctions will evolve in the 21st century and link these two concepts as the world moves forward into the information age.
DEFINITIONS
Economic sanctions can and do take many forms, with no two instances of sanctions imposition are exactly alike. Economists differ on a single definition of what encompasses economic sanctions. For the purposes of this paper, the term economic sanctions will only include the types of actions that are intended to be coercive in nature. Using the analogy of the carrot and stick approach to the term, we will be discussing the stick approach, not the carrot.
Economic sticks can and so take many forms. R. Pape, writing for the International Security Journal, lays out a set of clear and concise definitions that will be adopted for the remainder of this paper. Mr. Pape points out that there are two categories of economic weapons, trade restrictions and financial restrictions. Economic weapons could include a unilateral or international freeze on the target country's assets located in banks in the U.S. or abroad, getting the International Monetary Fund to stop any on-going loan programs or calling any existing loans. Examples of trade restrictions would be a total or partial ban of goods that could be imported from a country, attempts to ban exports from the target country, and also political attempts to convince other trading partners to cease trade with the target. Every country that is, or could be, a candidate for economic sanctions is vulnerable in one or more areas, finding the right pressure points is critical to achieving any long-term success. There are three main strategies in applying these weapons; economic sanctions, trade wars, and economic warfare. 1 He goes on and tries to clarify why sanctions are imposed:
Although coercers may suspend trade either comprehensively or partially, economic sanctions characteristically aim to impose costs on the economy as a whole.
Partial trade suspensions are generally adopted either as part of a calculated strategy to signal the potential of still worse pain to come if the target fails to comply, or as a second-best measure because more pressing domestic or international political constraints rule out comprehensive pressure.
The above discussion clearly points out that the purpose of these economic sticks are to impose costs and signal intentions that there could be worse pain to follow. The desired end result is compliance by the targeted country to the will of the coercer, whether an individual country or an international body such as the United Nations. In some cases, the stick approach can transform to the carrot approach once the target shows they are starting to comply with the desires of the coercing entity.
Before getting to historical and modern uses of sanctions, it will be helpful to discuss the theory of sanctions further.
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS' THEORY
There are numerous articles that discuss the effectiveness of economic sanctions, or their lack thereof. T. Morgan in an article published in the International Studies Quarterly propose a model based on the, "spatial model of bargaining" to assess the effectiveness of sanctions. . . .we believe that the focus of the debate regarding the effectiveness of sanctions is on whether they can enable the sanctioner to achieve its goals of altering the behavior of the target.
Furthermore, since many have advocated sanctions as an alternative to military force, a "successful" use of sanctions should enable the sanctioner to achieve its aims without a resort to arms . 5 The authors of this article refer to earlier works that suggest that the imposition of economic sanctions is part and parcel of classical bargaining theory and that they are simply another move away from the table, designed to influence the other party's interests and positions, that will eventually lead to a successful outcome from the sanctioner's viewpoint.
Other cases are referenced in the article, yet their success, or lack thereof, synthesize down to the question -What is successful? Depending on the researcher, and their interpretation of the goals to be achieved, success varies from one researcher to another.
R. Pape, an Assistant Government Professor at Dartmouth
College offers three criteria to help define a standard definition of success in this area:
1. The target state conceded to a significant part of the coercer's demands 2.
Economic sanctions were threatened or actually applied before the target changed its behavior
3.
No more credible explanation exists for the target's change of behavior. 6 Now that the theory of economic sanctions has been discussed, it will be useful to look at an abbreviated history of sanctions' use, some successful, some not.
MODERN HISTORY OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
Throughout the course of history sanctions have been used as an instrument of national power. An early form of sanctions involved the use of a total blockade of a town or a city when the opposing army would lay siege to the objective and totally cutoff the opponent. The lack of food and water would eventually work and the people would either fight or surrender.
The alternative was to die of thirst or starve to death. This tactic was generally effective but required patience and the proper circumstances. If the city had wells within the walls then food was the primary weapon and the siege would take longer. The optimum target was one that required the importation of food and water to feed the inhabitants of the city. When a city had water or large quantities of foodstuffs, a siege would not work or would take too long, and a more direct military approach was necessary to obtain the objective.
Today's method of siege warfare involves the use of economic sanctions against a target country and the effectiveness of these sanctions is also a function of the dependence of the target on trade with other countries. A country that was totally self-sufficient would be much less susceptible to the debilitating effects of economic sanctions. In the modern world, a totally self-sufficient country would be very hard, if not impossible, to find. Even the U.S. is not self-sufficient, even though it has the most robust economy in the world.
Early armies laying siege to a town or city generally did not have to worry about supplies getting to the target by neighbors or sympathetic towns. Complete encirclement of the objective was usually sufficient to ensure the total blockade of aid to the town. Modern economic warfare is not so simple.
There are almost no cases of economic sanctions being enforced with such completeness as the siege of ancient towns. Even during World War II, the blockade of Germany was not completely effective due to contiguous borders with countries they occupied, and the allies inability to close those borders.
Borders with friendly neighbors, aircraft that are able to fly over blockaded ports, and the lack of means or will necessary to stop and examine every single ship, truck or car entering a country to look for sanctioned items, makes enforcement spotty at best, and the desired results that much harder to achieve.
A modern success story for sanctions is found in the recent end to Apartheid in South Africa, an apparent direct result of the economic sanctions imposed on that country. After political instruments of power were tried and fell short, economic sanctions were imposed and ultimately appeared to be successful.
One reason they were apparently successful is that they were given time to work. The sanctions were imposed for years, and the political will of the sanctioners was strong enough to stay the course for the time required for the sanctions to bear fruit. T. Morgan is also careful to point out that they were successful only because all the trading partners of South Africa were united in their positions and they all enforced the t n sanctions imposed.
A more recent example shows the difference in expectations of the success of economic sanctions and the eventual outcome.
When the U.S. imposed oil importation sanctions against Haiti, the total dependence on the U.S. for this vital import should have quickly led the Haitians to bend to our will. G. Hufbauer, an international economics expert, points out that the Haitian geography and their total dependence on the U.S. for oil was the perfect setting for sanctions to work. 8 The ban was limited to oil imports and items such as food and medicine were exempted.
The second order effect of the oil ban kept the food and medicine from getting distributed throughout the island, and food grown inside the country was not able to travel to the Iran has been classified as a rogue state by U.S.
authorities and a sponsor of terrorism. In the spring of 1995 President Clinton announced that he was, "instituting a complete economic embargo against Iran". Although this move was applauded by certain powerful constituencies within the U.S., the embargo was implemented by executive order, had no teeth and was seen as a purely political move. Congress, led by conservative Republicans, crafted and passed the "Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act" which was duly signed by the President. This embargo targets the oil producing capability of Iran and purports to punish any American company that does business with Iran, as well as threaten sanctions against any foreign firm that does more than $40 million worth of business with Iran in one year. 13 The bill also contains a menu of five options that the president can choose from should he wish to impose sanctions against a foreign company that violates the conditions in the law. These are:
1. Denial of Export-Import Bank financing 2. Denial of licenses for sensitive exports and a prohibition of imports into the U.S. 
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Although this potential revenue could be seen as an opportunity cost, since they were not achieving these increased production levels before the imposition of sanctions, the loss of this additional revenue is not adding to the effectiveness of the sanctions.
Imposing economic sanctions on another country is also costly to the sanctioner. In this case the direct cost to the U.S. can be measured. The results, from Iran's point of view, fell short of their goals, but the measures taken did increase their GDP, although by not as much as they expected. During this period they made some mistakes, but recognized their errors and attempted not to repeat them. Oil exports, an implied target of the U.S. • 20 sanctions, were 90 percent of their projected levels. More recently, the GDP has been growing at a respectable, and sustainable rate of about 3 percent, but inflation averaged 42.6 percent. J. Amuzegar offers this explanation and succinctly states his views on the sanctions effectiveness:
While sanctions' advocates among Iran's hawkish critics in the U.S., and the inveterate monarchists in the Iranian exile community, may wish to relate these economic setbacks to the U.S. enhanced sanctions since June 1995, the evidence is not convincing.
The relatively slow growth of the economy and the relatively high rate of inflation, in 1995-1996, are more easily traceable to the very tight import compression dictated by the debt-service obligations, and the settlement of the 1992-93 payment arrears. The latter two were clear by-products of earlier monetary imprudence, mishandling of foreign exchange reserves, and the speculative surge of imports ahead of officially announced government intention to devaluate the rial, and the inexcusable lack of central bank supervision. 21 As with most economies of this type, hard empirical data on Iran is unavailable to scientifically study the effects, if any, Cuba was able to ride out the perceived "economic blockade"
by recognizing that the basic necessities of the people had to be taken care of in order for the government to stay in power.
Basic food necessities and gasoline became rationed items, but the rationing guaranteed that all citizens would received a basic subsistence, and citizens with additional means would still be able to purchase "luxury" items. As the blockade wore on, more and more items went on the rationing list until just about everything was rationed. It was not unlike economies during World War II when most items were rationed. In Cuba's case, the enemy was the blockade by the U.S.. Basic goods and services necessary for subsistence continued to be priced in local currency, enforced by the central government. There was a black market that traded in U.S. dollars, but it was small and kept under control by the will of the people to ride out the blockade and persevere despite the centralized planning and control exerted by the government.
Recognizing the necessity for trade and foreign investment, Cuba slowly started to relax its foreign investment laws and started to attract joint ventures. J. Gordon reports:
At last count there were over 240 joint ventures in Cuba, involving fifty-seven countries in forty areas of the economy. The foreign investment projects announced to date total some $5 billion...by the first half of 1996 the GDP was growing at 9.6 percent. Cuba transforms itself after Castro, the businesses currently in Cuba will be so firmly entrenched that they will never give back any disputed land claims, and there will be little left of the economic expansion for U.S. businesses to participate in. K. R. Himes, a moral theologian at the Washington Theological Union, discusses the need to apply a moral litmus test to any proposed sanctions that are being contemplated, and seems to share similar views of the Pope on this topic. 24 He then goes on to propose some criteria that would seem to assess the moral legitimacy of economic sanctions, and likens these criteria to the concept of just war. The following list paraphrases these seven criteria:
CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS
1.
Sanctions ought to be employed with good reason, since they can impose great hardship and suffering on innocent people.
2.
Less harmful ways of resolving the problem ought to be employed first, and the imposition of sanctions should not be seen as the end of diplomatic negotiations, but as leverage in the negotiation process.
.
The goal of the sanctions should be clearly stated so that the targeted government and the sanctioners both know what must be done to have the sanctions lifted.
4.
Sanctions should be selective and aimed primarily at those responsible for the crisis. Discrimination is needed in targeting.
5.
A monitoring system to assess the effect of the sanctions should be instituted.
Private groups may be better suited than opposing governments.
6.
When sanctions are imposed because of human rights abuses, the alleged victims of the abuse should support the policy of sanctions.
7.
Arguments for sanctions should be persuasive enough that support for the policy is widespread, even if the sanctions are imposed unilaterally or by a small group of nations.
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Although this article looks at sanctions from a moralistic viewpoint, the essence of what would make sanctions more effective than they generally are now, is contained within the seven criteria.
FINDINGS
Sanctions can backfire on the country or international body that imposes them. When sanctions are bluntly applied to a target country, the will of the people can become hardened towards the country that is trying to hurt them. Factor in a country where the government controls the press and a well planned propaganda campaign against the perceived aggressors, and as long as the government can provide at least a minimal existence for its citizens, sanctions will prove to be ineffective. Iraq is a perfect case in point. When national economic discipline slips, the result is financial chaos and threats to U.S. and global economic security.
The Army After Next (and other future services), must face the stark reality that future threats to U.S. national security and international stability will be increasingly financial in nature. 27 As noted before, economics is all about money, and money or currency could be vulnerable to attack. If indeed, money is a center of gravity, then the question arises, how best to attack it, or at least, threaten to attack it, as a move away from the bargaining table. The means are available to conduct this type of attack, but the will to press this type of attack would be lacking in the vast majority of situations that could be foreseen.
Although economic sanctions appear to be the choice of policy makers around the world, especially the U.S., their effectiveness is proving elusive in most cases. The future effectiveness of sanctions will continue to diminish as the global economy becomes increasingly linked together. Economic sanctions are like an endangered species that eventually will die out. It is not too hard to imagine when the informational part of the four instruments of national power will achieve dominance, and the economic weapon will be subsumed by information. In the end we may go back to having only three instruments of national power, where information will be dominant, and military and political options will play a diminished role in the conduct of foreign policy.
7042

